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THE LAWYER AS CITIZEN
James E. Fleming*
I. THE MORAL SCHIZOPHRENIA OF THE LAWYER-PERSON

The moral schizophrenia of the lawyer-person wrought by the
American adversarial system's differentiation of professional morality
from personal morality is at once alienating and anesthetizing.
Alienating in that it separates a person from her/his actions taken in
performing a professional role by attributing responsibility for these
actions and their consequences to the role itself rather than to the
individual. Anesthetizing in that it permits if not requires a
professional to constrict the moral universe inhabited on the job,
extruding moral sentiments that she/he otherwise might feel, numbing
the moral sense of ordinary personal responsibility.
There are basically four ways to treat this problem of split moral
personality. The first and second are to jettison one or the other of
the conflicting moralities to strive completely either to professionalize
(de-personalize) or to personalize (de-professionalize) a lawyer's
morality. The third is to deny the conflict altogether, by arguing that a
good lawyer is ipso facto a good person. And the fourth is to try to
bridge the discontinuity between professional and personal morality,
by developing a conception of integrated moral personality and
responsibility.
The first-the lawyer as professional-is represented by what
William H. Simon has called "the Ideology of Advocacy"' and by the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am happy to have the
opportunity to publish this paper in the Fordham Legal Ethics Colloquium inspired
by Professor Deborah L. Rhode's book, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the
Legal Profession. I had the good fortune (as a student at Harvard Law School) to
take the required course on The Legal Profession from Deborah (while she was a
visiting professor there in the 1984-85 academic year). Indeed, I wrote this paper for
her course! For publication, I have updated the paper somewhat, but the main
arguments remain the same. Happily (and I hope not just because I was a student in
Deborah's course), there are affinities between my conception of the lawyer as citizen
and Deborah's proposal for a contextual moral framework that requires lawyers to
accept personal responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional
actions. See Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal
Profession 66-67 (2000).
1. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 30, 30 [hereinafter Simon, Ideology]. More
recently, Simon has called this approach "the Dominant View." William H. Simon,
The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 7 (1998) [hereinafter Simon,
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ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The second-the lawyer
as person-is manifested in what might be termed "the Philosophy of
Personal Responsibility," expressed in its most extreme form by JeanPaul Sartre in his early existentialist period (when he held that to take
role moralities seriously is a form of "bad faith," an evasion of one's
absolute responsibility for who one is and what one does).2 It is
illustrated in somewhat less extreme form by the Kantian philosopher
John Ladd (who argues that the very idea of an organized professional
ethics is an absurdity, an intellectual and moral confusion a and also
evidently thinks that the notion of role morality, like the causal theory
of organizational responsibility, provides comfort to those who wish to
evade personal moral responsibility).4 In still less radical form, the
lawyer as person is represented by Simon (who calls for a nonprofessional ethics), 5 Richard Wasserstrom (who advocates some
degree of de-professionalization), 6 and Arthur Applbaum (who argues
that professional roles do not shield actors from "the public and
political reasons that actors have by virtue of being simply persons or
citizens"). 7 The third-a good lawyer as ipso facto a good person-is
expressed by Charles Fried's conception of "the lawyer as friend."8
The fourth-which I shall label "the lawyer as citizen"-I mean to9
sketch. It has much in common with the work of Deborah Rhode,
David Luban, 1° Robert Gordon,1 Thomas Nagel, 2 Sanford &
Mortimer Kadish, 3 and Gerald Postemal4 (and is for the most part
Practice of Justice].
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (Philip Mairet trans., 1948).
3. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal Profession:
Responsibility and Regulation 122 (3d ed. 1994) (excerpting John Ladd, The Quest
for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral Confision, in
Professional Ethics Activities in the Scientific and Engineering Societies (R. Chalk et
al. eds., 1980)).
4. Cf.John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations,
54 Monist 488,513-14 (1970).
5. Simon, Ideology, supra note 1, at 33-34, 130-44. In his important book, Simon
argues for institutionalizing "a Contextual View." Simon, Practice of Justice, supra
note 1, at 195-215.
6. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum.
Rts. 1, 12 (1975).
7. Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in
Public and Professional Life 109 (1999).
8. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976).
9. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000).
10. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988).
11. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
12. Thomas Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, reprinted in Mortal Questions 75
(1979) [hereinafter Nagel, Ruthlessness]; Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentationof Value,
reprintedin Mortal Questions 128 (1979) [hereinafter Nagel, Fragmentation].
13. Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of
Lawful Departures From Legal Rules (1973).
14. Gerald J.Postema, Moral Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
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compatible with that of Ladd, Simon, Wasserstrom, and Applbaum).
But it lays emphasis upon the lawyer's responsibility not just to the
client or to herself/himself, but also to the laws themselves,
understood not on a positivist model of the rule of rules 6 but on a
Rawlsian/Dworkinian constructivist model of law as integrity. 7 In
short, it emphasizes not only professional integrity and personal
integrity, but also what Dworkin calls the integrity of the law itself.'
A presupposition of this quest is that there can be no coherent and
defensible conception of the lawyer's responsibilities- whether
professional, personal, or principled-apart from a coherent and
defensible political philosophy and jurisprudence.
Practicing lawyers are understandably dubious of the suggestion
that political philosophy and jurisprudence have anything to teach
them about professional morality, whether as distinguished from, or
integrated with, personal morality. Admittedly, it would be useless
and inapt to tell practicing lawyers that whenever they are faced with
a complex moral dilemma they simply should ask, "What course of
action would the parties in John Rawls's original position"9 choose?"
Moreover, if confronted with a practical conflict, they hardly would
find it helpful to be told, in Nagel's terms, that given the singleness of
decision and the fragmentation of value, they must exercise what
Aristotle called practical wisdom, or judgment.' Nonetheless, how
one conceives law and the legal system, as a matter of political
philosophy and jurisprudence, importantly bears upon how one
conceives the lawyer's role and responsibilities as well as to whom
these responsibilities are owed. F.H. Bradley reportedly said that one
who denies that metaphysics is meaningful is a fellow metaphysician

Rev. 63 (1980).
15. See also Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to
Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1273 (1998) (advancing an interpretation of Lon
Fuller's view of lawyers that is similar to my notion of the lawyer as citizen).
16. See, eg., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L
Rev. 1175 (1989).
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 176-224 (1986), John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 90-99 (1993); see also James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution,72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
1& See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 176-224; Ronald Dworkin, Law as
Interpretation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527, 532, 543 (1982). Sharon Dolovich's analysis of
integrity in this symposium, while it has affinities to this notion, seems to focus more
on personal integrity than on the integrity of the law itself. Sharon Dolovich, Ethical
Lawyering and the Possibilityof Integrity, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1629, 1669-86 (2001).
19. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 17 (1971). Nonetheless, posing questions
through using Rawls's notion of the "veil of ignorance" can be a useful and
illuminating thought experiment for modeling fairness and impartiality. See, e.g.,
Rhode, supra note 9, at 113.
20. Nagel, Fragmentation,supra note 12, at 135, quoted in Postema, supra note 14,
at 67-68. Nonetheless, an important work in legal ethics does attempt to -rescue the
virtue of practical wisdom from the embarrassment that now surrounds it." Anthony
T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 51 (1993).
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oneself. The same goes for every branch of philosophy and every
practical problem in life.
Lord Brougham stirringly formulated the zealous partisanship
conception of the lawyer's role during his defense of Queen Caroline
as follows:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
consequences, though21 it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.

What is eloquent and inspiring is not necessarily coherent and
defensible. Vince Lombardi, in his own way, eloquently inspired his
football players with the slogan "Winning isn't everything, it's the only
thing." We might well commend this as locker-room pep-talk; it is
doubtful that we would base a conception of good sportsmanship
upon it. Why, then, would we base a conception of professional
responsibility and good lawyering upon Lord Brougham's remarks
instead of consigning them to speeches at law school graduations and
American Bar Association conventions? The first and third routes
above-the Ideology of Advocacy and the lawyer as friend-attempt
to provide a justification of the zealous partisanship conception of the
lawyer's role. I shall criticize these in reverse order, putting to one
side the differences between the criminal and the civil contexts.
II. FRIED'S LAWYER AS HETERONOMOUS, MERETRICIOUS FRIEND
Unlike Montaigne, who sought to reconcile the tension between
professional morality and personal morality by leading two radically
separate lives22-being a good lawyer in public and a good person in
private-Charles Fried argues that there is no fundamental
incompatibility between the two, indeed, that a good lawyer is ipso
facto a good person. 2 It is easy to overlook this aspect of his
argument by concentrating upon his conception of the lawyer as
friend. This latter notion is grossly misinterpreted if we understand
"friend" in any plausible ordinary language sense. For in ordinary
language, the expression "special-purpose friend" rings quite oddly, as
21. Fried, supra note 8, at 1060 n.1 (quoting 2 Trial Of Queen Caroline 8 (J.
Nightingale ed., 1821)).
22. See Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 20 (1951)
(quoting IV Essays De Montaigne 152-53 (Variorum Charpentier ed., 1876)), quoted
in Postema, supra note 14, at 63-64.
23. See Fried, supra note 8, at 1061.
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Fried readily acknowledges.24 And what Fried offers as "the classic
definition of friendship"-"that like a friend [the lawyer] ... adopts
your interests as his own" 2 (albeit for money)-does sound rather
more like the classical notion of prostitution, as Simon pointedly
suggests. 26
Whatever else may be said of it, Fried's conception of the moral
foundations of the lawyer-client relation does possess the virtue of
being rooted explicitly in a general moral theory. Appropriately
enough, its faults are as deep as the flaws in this theory. Only if we
understand this will we be able to comprehend that "friend" is a term
of art in Fried's libertarian theory of right and wrong. The moral
universe of this theory, much like that of Robert Nozick's libertarian
theory, is sparsely populated, inhabited almost entirely by negative
individual rights. 7 Accordingly, virtually the only way one can wrong
another person is to violate her/his rights-which is to say that Fried's
theory of right and wrong is more aptly dubbed a theory of rights and
wrongs. There is hardly any independent conception of good and
bad,' from which standpoint the lawyer within her/his rights could be
said not to be a good lawyer, let alone a good person. Within this
barren libertarian moral universe, "friend" is the category of
claimants whose demands on me I am not entitled to brush off with a
cold stare, the response "I am within my rights in ignoring you," and
the query "Or have I wronged you by violating your rights?" If the
central question is "And Who is My Neighbor?", - then perhaps "the
lawyer as neighbor" would be a more appropriate appellation than
"the lawyer as friend."
Fried says that his conception of the lawyer as friend "grows out of
the profoundest springs of morality: the concepts of personality,
identity, and liberty."'3 The lawyer, as the client's special-purpose
friend in regard to the legal system,3' ministers to "the need to
maintain one's integrity as a person"3-just as the doctor, as the
client's special-purpose friend in regard to the body, "helps maintain
24. Id at 1071.
25. Id.

26. Simon, Ideology, supra note 1, at 108; see also Simon, Practice of Justice, supra

note 1, at 19-20 (criticizing Fried's conception of the lawyer as friend).
27. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). See the incisive
critiques by H.L.A. Hart, Betveen Utility and Rights, reprinted in Essays In
Jurisprudence and Philosophy 198,199-208 (1983), and Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism
Without Foundations,85 Yale LJ. 136 (1975) (book review).
28. It should be noted that the titles of the three parts of Charles Fried, Right And
Wrong (1978), are "Wrongs," "Rights," and "Roles." On good and bad, as against
rights and wrongs, as moral categories, see Brian Barry, And Who Is My Neighbor?,
88 Yale LJ. 629, 636-43 (1979) (reviewing Fried, supra), and Thomas Nagel,
Subjective and Objective, in Mortal Questions 196, 203-04 & 204 n.8 (1979).
29. Barry, supra note 28, at 629.
30. Fried, supra note 8, at 1068.
31. Id. at 1071.
32 Id. at 1073.
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the very physical integrity which is the concrete substrate of
' Fried explains: "When I say the lawyer is his client's
individuality."33
legal friend, I mean the lawyer makes his client's interests his own
insofar as this is necessary to preserve and foster the client's
autonomy within the law."' The lawyer so understood is a devoted
and dear friend indeed.
To Fried, it does not matter that such legal friendship, unlike
natural friendship, is non-reciprocal, and that it is bought and paid
for." To raise these objections is to fail to understand his conception
of legal friendship. For he introduces this notion
to answer the argument that the lawyer is morally reprehensible to
the extent that he lavishes undue concern on some particular person.
The concept of friendship explains how it can be that a particular
person may rightfully receive more than his share of care from
another: he
can receive that care if he receives it as an act of
36
friendship.

But it would seem that Fried's lawyer as limited-purpose friend for
hire, in specially caring for the autonomy of the client's moral
personality through a relation that "systematically runs all one way, 37
ironically becomes the living instrument38 of the client-that, if you
will, the meretricious friend becomes the heteronomous 39 agent or
tool.
Moreover, Fried claims that whenever a lawyer exercises her/his
legal right to help whatever "friends" she/he chooses, she/he does
something which is morally worthy, entitling her/him to self-respect. 0
Central to this claim is his argument that "legal counsel-like medical
care-must be considered a good, and that he who provides it does a
useful thing."41 But neither lawyering nor doctoring, pace Fried, is
good in itself. There is something to be learned about legal care from
the fact that we can comprehend the concept of "the litigious
society" 42 as a diseased society. As for medical care, the notion of
"the therapeutic society" 43 as a sick society likewise is intelligible.

33. Id. at 1072.
34. Id. at 1073.
35. Id. at 1074-75.
36. Id. at 1074.
37. Id.
38. By "living instrument," I mean of course to echo Aristotle, Politics 9-11
(Ernest Barker trans., 1962).
39. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals *433
(heteronomy distinguished from autonomy).
40. Fried, supra note 8, at 1074-75.
41. Id. at 1077.
42. See, e.g., Doing Better And Feeling Worse: Health in the United States (John
H. Knowles, M.D. ed., 1977); Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society (1981).
43. See, e.g., Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (1976);
Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966).
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Fried anticipates the objection that, whatever the force of his
analogy with respect to the personal relation between individual
lawyers and individual clients, it is weaker with regard to the rather
more impersonal relation between individual lawyers and institutional
clients, whether governmental or corporate. (He says nothing about
the further disanalogy brought about by the rise of institutional
lawyers in mega-firms spread throughout the country and indeed the
world.) Fried writes:
My model posits a duty of exclusive concern (within the law) for the
interests of the client. This might be said to be inappropriate in the
corporate area because larger economic power entails larger social
obligations, and because the idea of friendship, even legal
friendship, seems peculiarly farfetched in such an impersonal
context.

After all, corporations and other institutions, unlike

persons, are creatures of the state. Thus, the pursuit of their
interests would seem to be especially subject to the claims of the
public good.'

"But," Fried insists, "corporations and other institutions are only
formal arrangements of real persons pursuing their real interests"' *leaving aside that he is in effect piercing the veil of the corporation's
legal personality to get at the real persons, and thus the real moral
personality behind it. Fried continues: "If the law allows real persons
to pursue their interests in these complex forms, then why are they not
entitled to loyal legal assistance, 'legal friendship,' in this exercise of
their autonomy just as much as if they pursued their interests in
simple arrangements and associations?"'
Now even if behind the veil of corporate legal personality we can
find the autonomy of "real" moral personality, the fact remains that it
is the corporation itself, not the real persons, that is the client. And
the corporation as such possesses no autonomy, no moral personality.
The translator of Kant's The Metaphysical Elements of Justice,' John
Ladd, has argued with characteristic vigor that "[s]ince... formal
organizations are not moral persons, and have no moral
responsibilities, they have no moral rights. In particular, they have no
moral right to freedom or autonomy."'
This is not to deny that
formal organizations are legal persons or that they have legal rights.
It is, however, to undermine what Fried calls the moral foundations of
the lawyer-corporate client relation. I do not wish to imply that
corporations are necessarily immoral. But I do mean to suggest that
because corporations are immortal-they have no soul to save or
44.
45.
46.
47.
1965).
48.

Fried, supra note 8, at 1075-76.
Id. at 1076.
Id
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (John Ladd trans.,
Ladd, supra note 4, at 508.
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damn,49 no autonomy to respect or violate-it would be a category

mistake to think that Kant's second formulation of the categorical
imperative-the end in itself formulation-applies to them. 0 Or, in
Rawls's terms, corporations do not possess the two powers of moral
personality-the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a
and sufficient
conception of the good-that are the necessary
51
conditions for being owed justice and respect.
Quite apart from autonomy and heteronomy, categorical and
hypothetical imperatives, the existence of large institutional clients
and large institutional law firms raises complex issues of moral
responsibility that the Ideology of Advocacy and Professional
Responsibility has not adequately addressed. It has focused more on
the problem of "dirty hands"52 than on what Dennis F. Thompson has
called the problem of "many hands." 53 One need not embrace the
perhaps extreme view of Ladd, that the notion of organizational
responsibility "gives aid and comfort to [individuals or groups of
individuals] who want to avoid responsibility for the social decisions in
which they participate," ' to recognize that when the smiling face of
the lawyer as friend meets the faceless organization man the
opportunities for evasion of responsibility multiply.
Finally, Fried casts himself as a participant in the Kantian revolt
against consequentialism 55 and in the consolidation of the paradigm
shift in moral theory from teleological utilitarianism to deontological
liberalism in the wake of the publication of Rawls's A Theory of
Justice. But in characterizing justice as fairness as a deontological
theory, and in differentiating it from utilitarianism as a teleological
theory, Rawls writes: "It should be noted that deontological theories
are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the
rightness of institutions and acts independently from their
consequences.
All ethical doctrines worth our attention take
consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not
would simply be irrational, crazy.''56 Likewise, any conception of
professional responsibility that offered what Deborah L. Rhode has
termed "the refuge of role '57 to an advocate who totally disregarded
consequences-indeed who, like Lord Brougham, maintained that it
49. See Barry, supra note 28, at 643-51 (emphasizing the relationship between the
"soul" and Fried's notions of "integrity" and "autonomy").

50. See Kant, supra note 39, at *428-29.
51. Rawls, supra note 17, at 15-20,29-35, 299-304; Rawls, supra note 19, § 77.
52. On "dirty hands" in relation to political action, see Michael Walzer, Political
Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 160 (1973).

53. Dennis F. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office 40-65 (1987).
54. Ladd, supra note 4, at 514.

55. See Barry, supra note 28, at 629-35.
56. Rawls, supra note 19, at 30.
57. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev.

589, 617 (1985).
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was her/his professional duty to "go on reckless of consequences"' s
and who accordingly disclaimed all personal responsibility for this
course of action-would be irrational, crazy, not to say irresponsible.59
Fried had begun by stating his moral inquiry thus: "Does the
lawyer whose conduct and choices are governed only by the
traditional conception of the lawyer's role, which these positive rules
[of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility] reflect, lead
a professional life worthy of moral approbation, worthy of respectours and his own?''6 I do not wish to imply that the lawyer as friend is
the lawyer as enemy-that the lawyer who is friend to the institutional
client, or who is a zealous advocate in the tradition of Lord
Brougham, is necessarily an enemy to the common good. But I do
mean to suggest that the good lawyer by this zealous partisanship
conception of the lawyer's role is not as unproblematically the good
person by Fried's purportedly Kantian moral theory as Fried would
have us believe.6 Therefore, we may doubt that the good lawyer is
ipso facto the good person, and accordingly reject the third route.
III. THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVOCACY

What of the first route-leading the radically separate lives of the
good lawyer in public and the good person in private-represented by
the Ideology of Advocacy and Professional Responsibility? This
route has been incisively criticized by Simon, Wasserstrom, Postema,
and Rhode, among others.
Wasserstrom argues for deprofessionalization-for lawyers "to see themselves less as subject to
role-differentiated behavior and more as subject to the demands of
the moral point of view."' Along similar although more radical lines,
Simon contends that if we are to take seriously the values invoked to
justify the Ideology of Advocacy and Professional Responsibilityindividuality, autonomy, dignity, and the like-we must abandon this
ideology and legal professionalism for an alternative conception of
non-professional advocacy and non-professional ethics that furthers
the "value of law" as opposed to the "rule of law." In this respect,
58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. Rhode argues for a contextual moral framework that requires lawyers to
accept personal responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional
actions. Rhode, supra note 9, at 66-67.

60. Fried, supra note 8, at 1061 (emphasis added).
61. I shall not take up the question raised by the Kantian Ladd, whether the very
idea of a code of professional ethics is an absurdity-an intellectual and moral

confusion. Hazard & Rhode, supra note 3, at 98 (excerpting John Ladd, The Quest for
a Code of ProfessionalEthics: An Intellectual and Moral Confitsion, in Professional

Ethics Activities in the Scientific and Engineering Societies (R. Chalk et al. eds.,
1980)).
62. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 12.
63. Simon, Ideology, supra note 1, at 33-34, 130-44; see also Simon, Practice of
Justice, supra note 1, at 79-85 (arguing for furthering a substantive instead of a

positivist conception of the law); id. at 138 (arguing for a "Contextual View" of legal
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his proposal bears affinities to my notion of the lawyer as citizen
pursuing the integrity of law itself understood on the constructivist
model as the forum of principle as contrasted with the positivist model
as the rule of rules. Postema eschews the routes of de-professionalism
and professionalism in favor of a conception of integrated moral
personality and responsibility along with a conception of the lawyer's
role as a role that requires practical judgment having recourse to the
ends it is designed to advance6M Finally, Rhode argues for a
contextual moral framework that requires Iawyers to accept personal
responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional
actions.65 These conceptions mesh well with and help give content to
the idea of the lawyer as citizen.
In order for professional role to offer the safe refuge from the
ordinary moral responsibilities of the citizen that the Ideology of
Advocacy seeks, the following preconditions would have to obtain.
First, litigation would have to be what Rawls calls a situation of "pure
procedural justice" instead of "imperfect procedural justice."'
Second, it would have to be more nearly a completely autonomous
language-game than it is, so as not to require resort to background
morality in interpreting legal materials. And third, the lawyer's role
would have to be more fixed or well-defined than it is, so as not to
require recourse to institutional and background ends in exercising
professional judgment.
It should be granted to the Ideology of Advocacy that the American
adversarial system depends for its fair and just administration upon
the performance of the differentiated roles of advocate, judge, and
jury. For the lawyer advocate to confound these roles by negatively
pre-judging a client's case would be to risk compromising the integrity
of the system's processes and therefore tainting its outcomes.
So far well and good, but the Ideology of Advocacy seems to go
further, whether it takes the high road of the crusading champion of
rights or the low road of the cynical hired gun. It appears to blur or
obliterate the distinction between imperfect procedural justice and
pure procedural justice. "Imperfect procedural justice," Rawls writes,
"is exemplified by a criminal trial":67
The desired outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty
if and only if he has committed the offense with which he is charged.
The trial procedure is framed to search for and to establish the truth
ethics whereby "[1]awyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice").
64. Postema, supra note 14, at 64, 81-83.
65. Rhode, supra note 9, at 66-67. A similar conception inspires Russell Pearce's
proposed Model Rule 1.0. Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers Are Morally
Accountable, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1805 (2002).
66. Rawls, supra note 19, at 85.
67. Id.
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in this regard. But it seems impossible to design the legal rules so

that they always lead to the correct result. The theory of trials
examines which procedures and rules of evidence, and the like, are
best calculated to advance this purpose consistent with the other
ends of the law. Different arrangements for hearing cases may
reasonably be expected in different circumstances to yield the right
results, not always but at least most of the time. A trial, then, is an
instance of imperfect procedural justice. Even though the law is
carefully followed, and the proceedings

fairly and properly

conducted, it may reach the wrong outcome. An innocent man may
be found guilty, a guilty man may be set free. In such cases we
speak of a miscarriage of justice: the injustice springs from no
human fault but from a fortuitous combination of circumstances
which defeats the purpose of the legal rules.6s
Rawls concludes: "The characteristic mark of imperfect procedural
justice is that while there is an independent criterion for the correct
outcome, there is no feasible procedure which is sure to lead to it."'
By contrast, "pure procedural justice obtains when there is no
independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or
fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair,
whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly
followed."7 Rawls offers gambling as an illustration of this situation,
and any other game would serve as well. The analogy that lawyers
often draw between a trial and a game is overdravn to the extent that
it collapses the distinction between imperfect procedural justice and
pure procedural justice. The same holds for the "fight" theory as
against the "truth" theory of trials. The trouble with the Ideology of
Advocacy lies not in the shortcomings of procedural justice as such,
contra Simon,7 2 but in its tendency to confound imperfect procedural

justice and pure procedural justice and in its concomitant plea of "the
epistemological demurrer." This is an unacceptable plea not only in
the court of substantive justice, as Simon may imply, but also in the
court of imperfect procedural justice.

6& Id. at 85-86.
69. Id at 86.
70. Id.
71. CompareJerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949), with Marvin Frankel, Partisan
Justice (1978), and Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975). Yet,'Rhode might argue that, in the criminal context, "an
ethic of zealous advocacy remains crucial." Rhode, supra note 9, at 74. Rhode
appears to find the Ideology of Advocacy crucial both as compensation for the dearth
of legal resources available to indigent defendants and in recognition of two
"distinctive" features of criminal proceedings: "their potential for governmental
abuse" and "their effect on individuals' lives, liberty, and reputation." Id. at 72.
72. Simon, Ideology, supra note 1, at 38.
73. This phrase is from Rhode, supra note 57, at 618, but I may be using it
differently, to include as well what she calls "the appeal to agnosticism," if not
everything she includes under "Skepticism: The Refuge of Role." Id. at 617, 620.
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Furthermore, even if the legal process is analogous to a game, it is
only a relatively autonomous language-game.
Ladd uses
Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game 74 in analyzing moral
responsibility and instrumental rationality in formal organizations,75
and Dworkin uses it in analyzing the institutions of legislation and
adjudication. 76 The games of chess and baseball, for example, are
quite autonomous from background morality and independent criteria
of justice. That is, the moves, defenses, and referee's or umpire's
decisions are made quite independently of considerations external to
the rules and character of these games. Ladd writes: "Furthermore,
while playing a game it is thought to be 'unfair' to challenge the rules.
Sometimes it is even maintained that any questioning of the rules is
unintelligible."'
Were litigation a completely autonomous rather
than merely a relatively autonomous language-game, the route of
curing the moral schizophrenia of the lawyer-person by jettisoning
personal morality for professional morality would be more plausible
(and perhaps more palatable) than it is in fact. But legal materials are
not self-interpreting, and in making arguments about how they should
be interpreted, one must have resort to background morality.7 8
Moreover, unlike a doctor, who can minister to the needs of a
patient without vouching for the justice of the patient's ends, the
lawyer-advocate must affirmatively make the case for the justice of
the client's ends, or at any rate must seem to endorse and must try to
persuade others to adopt the points of view articulated on behalf of
the client's cause. To the citizen, therefore, the lawyer appears
hypocritical or insincere in matters of grave importance to the polity.
Wasserstrom suggests that this helps to account for the peculiar
hostility that is directed by lay persons toward lawyers: "The verbal,
role-differentiated behavior of the lawyer qua advocate puts the
lawyer's integrity into question in a way that distinguishes the lawyer
from the other professionals."7 9
It may be that, whatever the lawyer realizes when reflecting upon
the adversarial system from the external, critical standpoint of the
philosopher, the lawyer qua advocate is obligated by role and bound
psychologically to blur80 or obliterate the distinction between pure and
imperfect procedural justice. (Perhaps the fight theory alone is
comprehensible to those engaged in legal combat.) For one thing,
when the lawyer is discharging the responsibilities of the role of
74. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 7 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968).
75. Ladd, supra note 4, at 491-92.
76. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 101-07 (1977).
77. Ladd, supra note 4, at 492.
78. See Dworkin, supra note 76, at 101-07.
79. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 14.
80. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers From Their Profession:
Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 5 J. Legal Prof. 31 (1980).
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advocate within the trial process, the "theory of counter attitudinal
advocacy""1 suggests that she/he may persuade herself/himself in the
process of trying to persuade judge and jury. This may occur for
reasons of cognitive dissonance, incentive, or self-persuasion.
For another, the prejudices (in Hans-Georg Gadamer's sense)" that
an interpreter of legal materials brings to bear upon their
interpretation is importantly constitutive of understanding. There are
no interpretive "brute facts" that are "just there" prior to any
"interpretive strategy."3 And the prejudices that the advocateinterpreter is bound by role to bring to bear in constructing legal
arguments are pro-client-happily for the client and to some degree
happily for the psyche of the lawyer. Both the theory of counter
attitudinal advocacy and the hermeneutic conception of
understanding thus offer some comfort to the split moral personality
of the lawyer. Unhappily for the lawyer, she/he may have to argue
different sides on a given issue from one case to the next. John Stuart
Mill may well be right that "[h]e who knows only his own side of the
case knows little of that."' Fortunately for the system, truth may out
from the clash of both sides, but unfortunately for the lawyer, who
may have to make the case for both sides, not truth but skepticism
may out.
What Nagel has well called "the fragmentation of value"1 both
lends some plausibility to the Legal Process tradition's project of
allocating institutional roles' and suggests its ultimate limitations. As
against the grand systematizers who would develop a reductive
unification of ethics, Nagel provides a more pluralistic conception of
five fundamental types of value: special obligations, rights, utility,
perfectionist ends, and private commitments! 7 Roughly speaking, the
Legal Process tradition allocates responsibility for utility to
legislatures and for rights to courts, and it assigns special obligations
of roles to the various sorts of participants in the legislative and
judicial processes. But the very fragmentation of values and
allocation of roles that is to facilitate the processes of decision may
intensify as well as alleviate practical conflicts-conflicts thrown up by
or rooted in the disparity between the fragmentation of value and the
singleness of decision.88 Their sound resolution requires practical
81. Id. at 32-34.
82. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2000) (1960).
83. See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text In This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive
Communities (1980).
84. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 35 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
85. Nagel, Fragmentation,supra note 12, at 128-41.
86. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
87. Nagel, Fragmentation,supra note 12, at 129-33.
88. Id. at 128, 134-35.
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wisdom or judgment, 89 but the allocation of roles seems to forbid
anyone to exercise such all-encompassing judgment.
This appearance is sharpened to the degree that we conceive the
allocated roles to be what Postema, following Mortimer and Sanford
Kadish,9° has termed "fixed roles" rather than "recourse roles."'" If
litigation were an institution completely autonomous from
background morality, and if the role of a lawyer were as fixed as that
of a clerk, there would be no need for her/him to have recourse to
background and institutional ends in order to discharge professional
responsibilities as well as personal responsibilities. Whatever shelter a
fixed role may offer its occupant, however, a recourse role does not
provide complete refuge from personal responsibility or at any rate it
undermines the radical distinction between professional and personal
responsibility that the Ideology of Advocacy is at pains to maintain.
If the Ideology of Advocacy and Professional Responsibility errs on
one side in attempting to jettison personal responsibility, then the
Philosophy of Personal Responsibility may err on the other in trying
to jettison professional responsibility and so to break down the partial
though not complete refuge of role. Even if, as Nagel puts it, roleagents "seem to have a slippery moral surface," 93 there is something to
the special status of action in a role. It does not necessarily bespeak
bad faith, it is not inevitably an evasion of personal responsibility.
Nagel suggests that "[i]f roles encourage illegitimate release from
[ordinary] moral restraints it is because their moral effect has been
'
distorted."94
It is not only those who would cloak license in the
responsibilities of role who distort the moral effect of roles; those who
would completely disrobe role-agents may do likewise. For, as Nagel
insists, "there is something to the idea of a moral discontinuity"95
between personal and professional morality. But the discontinuity is
not so great as to liberate and insulate the role-actor from all
considerations external to the role itself.
The Kadishes distinguish two sorts of considerations that may guide
the conduct of a role-agent. First, "'role reasons'-reasons based on
the constraints of his role tempered by whatever discretion recourse
to role ends may afford him. '96 And second, "'excluded reasons'reasons that he may recognize as an individual but that in his role he
89. Id. at 135.
90. Kadish & Kadish, supra note 13, at 22-23,33-36.
91. Postema, supra note 14, at 81-83.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
93. Nagel, Ruthlessness,supra note 12, at 75.
94. Id. at 76.
95. Id. at 80. Nagel makes this remark with reference to the discontinuity
between the private morality of citizens and the public morality of persons who hold
official roles, but it applies just the same to the discontinuity between the private
morality of citizens and the professional morality of lawyers.
96. Kadish & Kadish, supra note 13, at 27.
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cannot take into account."' They suggest that when the role reasons
for undertaking an action and the excluded reasons conflict, a person
committed to a role "does not simply weigh the role reasons equally
against the excluded reasons, and then act according to whichever set
of reasons is greater." 98
Instead he acknowledges his obligation to his role by imposing an
extra burden, or surcharge, so to speak, on the excluded reasons, so
that they must have significantly greater weight than the role
reasons, rather than merely greater weight, in order to sway him. 99
The Kadishes argue, moreover, that in dealing with obligations of
role, the surcharge on excluded reasons is either finite or infinite.
First, "[i]mposing a finite surcharge is the practical result of being a
person who at once accepts his obligation to a role and continues 'to
think of himself as an individual with other commitments as well."' 0
Second, "imposing an infinite surcharge is the practical result of being
a person who puts his obligation to a role unqualifiedly first."'' In the
Kadishes' view, "[i]t is difficult to see how an absolutely unqualified
commitment to any role can be defended.""- To accept a role that
imposes, or at least in its most rhetorically excessive moments seems
to impose, an infinite surcharge would be tantamount to selling
oneself into role-slavery. No profession, even if it could define a fixed
role as contrasted with a recourse role, is entitled to exact such a
surcharge. Role-slaves of this sort would be irresponsible citizens.
The lawyer as citizen would submit to only a finite surcharge.
IV. THE LAWYER AS CITIZEN

Within the conception of the lawyer as citizen, I include the
proposals of Simon, Wasserstrom, Postema, and Rhode, to say
nothing of the implications of Nagel and the Kadishes. I also have in
mind a notion of the lawyer's responsibility neither to the client nor to
herself/himself but to the laws themselves, understood on the
Rawlsian/Dworkinian constructivist model of law as integrity."° The
lawyer as citizen looks upon the laws so understood with the
reflective, critical attitude characteristic of what H.L.A. Hart calls the
internal point of view,"" or what Sotirios A. Barber terms the
standpoint of the citizen as constitutionalist. 1 5 Conceptions of
lawyer's responsibility have focused too much upon professional
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
See sources cited supra note 17.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 56-57 (1961).
Sotirios A. Barber, On What The Constitution Means (1984).
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integrity and personal integrity and too little upon the integrity of the
law itself.'06
In Punishment and Responsibility, Hart suggests that the diverse
applications of the word "responsibility" (for example, roleresponsibility, causal-responsibility, liability-responsibility, and
capacity-responsibility) may share a unifying feature encapsulated in
its etymology, which suggests that the notion of an "answer" plays a
central part.1" He observes that the original meaning of the word
"answer," as in the Latin respondere, "was not that of answering
questions, but that of answering or rebutting accusations or charges,
which, if established, carried liability to punishment or blame or other
adverse treatment. 108 Hart argues that there is "a very direct
connexion between the notion of answering in this sense and liabilityresponsibility."' 109 And he contends that "[r]ole-responsibility is
perhaps less directly derivable from the primary sense of liabilityresponsibility: the connexion is that the occupant of a role is
contingently responsible in that primary sense if he fails to fulfil the
duties which define his role and which are hence his
responsibilities.""'
To whom is the lawyer primarily responsible? That is, to whom
must the lawyer ultimately answer? To the client? To the adversarial
system? To the legal process merely, or to the legal substance also?
To the laws themselves, and to the principles of justice that they
should further? Let us imagine a dialogue between the laws and the
lawyer analogous to the dialogue between the laws of Athens and
Socrates in Plato's Crito. In holding the lawyer to moral account,
would the laws be satisfied by a lawyer who took refuge in role in
defense of a life at law spent, for example, in pursuit of the Ideology
of Advocacy or in adherence to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct? Or would the laws more likely dismiss such a lawyer as a
sophist unworthy of citizenship?
Suppose that in answering to the laws, the lawyer were passionately
to quote Lord Brougham's stirring formulation of the zealous
partisanship conception of the lawyer's role, which bears repeating:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
106. On the integrity of the law itself, see sources cited supra note 17.
107. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment And Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of
Law 212-14 (1968).
108. Id. at 265.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.'
What if the laws were to ask in reply, "Who gave you license to
assume such a 'first and only duty' to the exclusion of your duties as a
citizen, and therefore to exclude all considerations of consequences
for your country?" Would it be a complete response for the lawyer to
retort, "You, the laws, are the author of my acts, for the adversarial
system that you have established prescribes the duties which define
the lawyer's role, and I have but fulfilled these responsibilities. I am
but an actor in your play."
This response perhaps is initially plausible, and indeed the trial is
often analogized to the theatre, and the legal personae are accordingly
likened to the dramatis personae. To hold the dramatis personae
responsible for the consequences of their actions within the play
would be absurd, not only because the play is fictitious, but also
because the actors' scripted roles are quite well-defined. An actor
need not answer to the literary critic; the author alone is responsible
for the script.
But, it is not so to the same degree with the legal personae; lawyers
may hide behind the professional mask to a lesser extent. For one
thing, their roles are not so well-defined-their scripts call for much
improvisation, and so they must extemporaneously exercise their
creativity and judgment. For another, real world consequences for
their fellow citizens and country follow from their actions, both when
they play the routine parts and when they improvise, both when they
may wear the professional mask and when we may pluck it from their
faces. Lawyers thus may be held to answer to the moral critic and to
the laws. They may attribute only partial authorship of their acts to
the laws themselves and to the roles they define, which did not give
lawyers license to abrogate fully their responsibilities as citizens."1 2
De-personalization or professionalization "nourishes the illusion that
personal morality does not apply to [a professional or official role]
with any 11force,
and that it cannot be strictly assigned to [one's] moral
3
account.

111. See citation supra note 21.
112. Benjamin Zipursky cautions that, contra Rhode, "[tlaking responsibility for all
of the consequences of one's actions as a lawyer, or taking responsibility for the
actions as if they were one's own, does not provide a tenable or defensible way of
understanding the lawyer's role." Benjamin Zipursky, Regulation and Responsibility
for Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 70 Fordham L Rev. 1949, 1955 (2002).
Zipursky's point is not inconsistent with mine. He concludes that, parallel to my
conception of the lawyer as citizen, "a lawyer can reject the suspension of morality"
(de-professionalization), "without losing the distinction between her role as a lawyer
and the place of the client whom she is advising" (de-personalization). Id. at 1956.
113. Nagel, Ruthlessness,supra note 12, at 77.
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And so, the lawyer as citizen promises to be superior, as a treatment
for the moral schizophrenia of the lawyer-person, to the Ideology of
Advocacy, which in its highest aspirations borders on sophistry, to the
lawyer as friend, who turns out to be a heteronomous, meretricious
friend, and to the Philosophy of Personal Responsibility, which strips
lawyers altogether of the professional mask. Sanford Levinson once
called for a Protestant constitutional revolution and the installation of
the "lawyerhood of all citizens" akin to Luther's "priesthood of all
' 4 Likewise, this essay is a call for the citizenhood of all
believers.""
15
lawyers.

114. Sanford V. Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, Harper's, May 1977,
at 35, 99 n.; see also Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion,
1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123.
115. For a sketch of an understanding of the lawyerhood of all citizens and the
citizenhood of all lawyers, see Russell G. Pearce, Democracy and Professionalism:
How the Decline of Professionalism Will Reinvigorate Democracy 12-15, Baker &
McKenzie Lecture at Loyola University-Chicago School of Law (1997) (manuscript
on file with the Fordham Law Review); cf.Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's
Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the OriginalUnderstandingof the
American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 381 (2001) (chronicling the
shift in the conception of lawyers' professional role from a citizen model"identify[ing] and pursu[ing] the public good when serving in government positions,
as civic leaders, and as representativesof clients"-to a "hired gun" model-zealously
pursuing clients' self-interests (emphasis added)).

